Is Care Enough? Proceed with Care:
Final Report of the Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies by Majury, Diana
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 17 Issue 1 Article 11 
4-1-1994 
Is Care Enough? Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
Diana Majury 
Carleton University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Diana Majury, "Is Care Enough? Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies" (1994) 17:1 Dal LJ 279. 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Diana Majury* Is Care Enough? Proceed with
Care: Final Report of the
Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies
Having just finished reading Proceed with Care: Final Report of the
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies,1 I find that the
questions I am left with pertain less to the technologies themselves,
although I certainly do have those, and more to the role and effectiveness
of royal commissions generally, and this Royal Commission specifi-
cally.2 I am left wondering, Was it worth it? What really was the point of
it all? How could we expect any group of seven-or was it nine? well,
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University.
1. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: FinalReport
of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vols. 1-2 (Ottawa: Minister of
Government Services Canada, 1993) [hereinafter Report].
2. I should confess, at the outset, that my critical reaction to the Report was probably fairly
predictable. I write as one who has serious concerns about reproductive technologies and the
rapid and unchecked pace of their development and as one who was sceptical of the usefulness
of a royal commission on this subject. Back in 1988, mine was among the few feminist voices
arguing against the call for a Royal Commission on Reproductive Technologies. We were
concerned then that, at best, the Commission would take a "safe middle-of-the-road position";
that it was both too little too late and too much too soon (see C. Clement & D. Majury, "A
Question of Strategy" (1988) 9:2 Healthsharing 19). Connie Clement and I made an oral
presentation to the Commission in which we supported others' calls for a general moratorium
on reproductive technologies during the time that the Commission conducted its work. In
addition, for me the credibility of the Report was irredeemably undermined, regardless of its
content, by a number of factors. These include the serious delays in the Commission's reporting
dates (originally scheduled for October3l, 1991, then October 1992, thenJuly 1993 and finally
November 15, 1993. See M. Eichler, "Frankenstein meets Kafka: The Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies" in G. Basen, M. Eichler & A. Lippman, eds., Misconcep-
tions: The Social Construction of Choice andthe New Reproductive Technologies, vol. I (Hull:
Voyageur, 1993) [hereinafterMisconceptions) 196); the controversies relating to the processes
of the Commission and the Commissioners themselves (see infra note 3); the secrecy
surrounding the research conducted by the Commission, giving rise to criticisms from both the
Social Science Federation of Canada and the Canadian Association of University Teachers
(Eichler, ibid. at 211); and the stories of intolerance and control told by researchers and other
staff hired by the Commission (see Anonymous, "Inside the Royal Commission" in Miscon-
ceptions, ibid., 223).
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ultimately five people 3-to respond with depth and substance to a
mandate that required them to "inquire into and report on current and
potential medical and scientific developments related to new reproduc-
tive technologies, considering in particular their social, ethical, health,
research, legal and economic implications and the public interest, recom-
mending what polices and safeguards should be applied"?4 At bottom,
this was somewhat akin to asking the Commissioners to report back on
the meaning of life. The technologies under examination involve assisted
conception, prenatal diagnosis, embryo research and genetic technolo-
gies. These technologies deal with the creation of life. The values,
ideologies and interests involved flow from our definitions of "life," from
what we see as important in and about "life."
Even though, at one level, the mandate was impossible and over-
whelming, at another level, it was limited and too narrowly focused.
Criticisms directed against the Commission can be traced back to the
limitations imposed by the mandate. The Commission has been accused
of failing to look behind the existing technologies to assess their appro-
priateness and at least to question the trajectory that these technologies
have put us on. This apparently was one of the tensions that arose among
the original seven commissioners. According to Louise Vandelac:
there has not been adequate questioning of [reproductive technologies']
nature, validity and relevance, of their impact and profound meaning. In
this vacuum, the debate on these technologies has drifted, focusing mostly
on the modes to manage them. This has helped to insure the social
legitimization of their development. And, while the mandate and interdis-
ciplinary composition of the Commission should theoretically have al-
3. The Government originally appointed seven people to serve on the Royal Commission:
Patricia Baird as Chair, and Bruce Hatfield, Martin H6bert, Grace Jantzen, Maureen McTeer,
Suzanne Scorsone and Loiuse Vandelac as Commissioners. Disagreements arose among the
Commissioners over how the Commission was being run and the research process undertaken.
Four of the Commissioners (Hatfield, H6bert, McTeer and Vandelac) tried to discuss their
concerns internally and then with the Clerk of the Privy Council, at which point they were told
that the government cannot interfere in the workings of a commission. However, three weeks
later, the government appointed two new members to the Commission (Bartha Knoppers and
Susan McCutcheon) and issued a second Order-in-Council, revising the Commission's
procedures so as to strengthen the authority of the Chair. On December 6, 1991, the four
"dissident" Commissioners brought an action against the federal government and Patricia
Baird in which they sought to have the second Order-in-Council declared invalid. Ten days
later, the four commissioners were fired from the Commission, leaving the three original
appointees plus the two recent additions. See M. Eichler, ibid.; "Appendix: Statement of
Claim" in Misconceptions, ibid., 273; R. Howard, "Commission Dispute Breaks out in
Lawsuit" The Globe andMail (7 December 1991) A6; and G. York & R. Howard, "Dissidents
Fired from Commission on Reproduction" The Globe and Mail (17 December 1991) A6.
4. Report, supra note 1 at 3.
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lowed it to fill the vacuum meaningfully, the process and structure
imposed by Dr. Baird compromised this potential.'
While I would agree with Vandelac that this lack of fundamental
questioning is indeed a shortcoming, I think that the fault lies, at least in
part, with the mandate given to the Commission. The mandate wording
has a fait accompli air to it, an air that permeates the Report itself. The
mandate and the Report seem to assume that, given the current existence
of the technologies and the developments to date, the focus now can only
be on policies and safeguards; we are past the point of fundamental
(re)thinking. The Commissioners dismissed the calls for a general mora-
torium, arguing that it was neither desirable nor feasible.6 The approach
oftheReportis one of containment, management and monitoring. Having
been asked to explore the meaning of life, the Commission was limited
to examining life as we know it, not how it might be, if different choices
were made-not as if those choices could still be considered open.
The title of the Report, "Proceed with Care," reflects this same
assumption of inevitability. The implication is that these technologies
are, will be, and should be, ongoing and that for the most part as long as
this is done with "care," it is a good thing. The care in the title is
presumably intended to have two meanings. First, the title invokes the
"proceed with caution" traffic signs that warn drivers of potential dangers
ahead that require their strict attention and prudence. This bothers me for
a couple of reasons. The implied allusion seems too "cute" for the very
serious subject matter at hand, thereby tending to trivialize the whole
report. I am one who enjoys word plays, frequently using them in my own
writing. However, this title served as a reminder that one can sometimes
get carried away and undermine one's content in the pursuit of one' s own
cleverness.
The other, and even more troubling reason I am uncomfortable with
this allusion-given my own mistrust of most of these technologies,
5. L. Vandelac, "The Baird Commission: From 'Access' to 'Reproductive Technologies' to
the 'Excesses' of Practitioners or the Art of Diversion and Relentless Pursuit" in Misconcep-
tions, supra note 2, 253 at 269-70.
6. Supra note I at 15.
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reenforcedby some of the alarming information compiled in theReport7-
is that the standard being promoted is less than that advocated under
adverse road conditions, that is, the Commission advises "care" rather
than "caution." While the difference between care and caution is only one
of degree, using caution as the backdrop to the chosen term, "care," serves
to down play any sense of urgency or risk. The title depicts the technolo-
gies as less dangerous and uncertain than even the information in the
Report and its own recommendations would suggest.
The second meaning of care conjured by the title of the Report relates
to care as caring. In this sense of the word, care becomes mantra-like in
its invocation throughout the Report. Chapter Three of the report outlines
the ethical framework employed by the Commissioners. They adopted
what they describe as an "ethic of care" in conjunction with eight guiding
principles designed to "give concrete expression to the ideal of care."8
This ethic of care, said to be found "in secular mainstream ethics, in
feminist theory, and in religious thinking," 9 is described in the following
terms:
moral wisdom and sensitivity consist, in the first instance, in focussing on
how our interests are often interdependent. And moral reasoning involves
trying to find creative solutions that can remove or reduce conflict, rather
than simply subordinating one person's interests to another. The priority,
therefore, is on helping human relationships to flourish by seeking to foster
the dignity of the individual and the welfare of the community.
Where intervention is necessary, its aim should be creative empower-
ment so that, as far as possible, everyone is served and adversarial
situations do not arise. At the very least, intervention must, in this view,
avoid causing harm to human relationships.... The concept of non-
maleficence goes beyond simply avoiding actions that might cause harm,
7. This includes, for example, information on the use of sperm in assisted insemination
without proper testing for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases (ibid. at 449); on the use
of IVF, not only in circumstances for which there is as of yet insufficient evidence to categorize
the procedure as either effective or ineffective, but also in circumstances for which the
Commission actually categorizes IVF as ineffective (ibid. at 519); on the pressures exerted on
some women to have prenatal diagnoses and then to abort a fetus with a disability (ibid. at 754,
770); and on the level of education required to understand some of the consent forms used with
respect to these technologies-IVF forms rated as requiring one graduate degree to understand
(ibid. at 549) and assisted insemination forms requiring up to four years of post-secondary
education (ibiL at 461).
8. Ibid. at 52.
9. Ibid. at 51. While the Commission prides itself on the use of these diverse sources, I am quite
sceptical. These different schools of thought may all employ the concept of care but I would
expect that their approaches to and understandings of the meaning of care differ considerably.
Rather than explore these differences, the Commission glosses over them in the hope of
establishing some unchallengeable common ground. It is, after all, difficult to argue against an
ethic of care.
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to taking steps to prevent harm and create conditions in which harm is less
likely to occur and beneficial results are the more likely outcome. 0
While it all sounds nice and "caring," the overall impression that I am
left with from this discussion and the Report itself is that of a desperate
attempt to avoid conflict. The goal seems to be to find some middle
position that mediates between the dangers and risks of reproductive
technologies on the one hand and the benefits and desires for them on the
other. But these reproductive technologies are highly controversial;
attitudes toward them are characterized by heated debates and passion-
ately held positions. These disagreements are acknowledged in the
Report but are usually understated. The approach throughout is to present
the tensions in muted terms, as perspectives, concerns, or fears that, by
implication, form the background to the Commission's reasoned discus-
sion and recommendations. The Report rarely directly addresses or
responds to the substance behind the tensions. These are issues that
require some tough and firm decision-making, in the absence of which it
is likely to be reproductive business as usual. The burdens imposed by the
recommended licensing, monitoring and reporting requirements 1 may
mean that only big business will be able to provide the services. I am not
sure that these burdens will do much to change or curtail current practices.
The eight guiding principles enlisted to ground the application of the
ethic of care are "individual autonomy, equality, respect for human life
and dignity, protection of the vulnerable, non-commercialization of
reproduction, appropriate use of resources, accountability, and balancing
of individual and collective interests."'1 2 There is nothing wrong with
these principles. In fact, they seem most laudable. The problem is, How
does one operationalize these lofty ideals? It is a critical, but perhaps
impossible task to fully integrate these concepts; it is possibly an
unrealistic expectation to impose on the Commission. However, I cannot
help but wonder what if, in pursuing, for example, the guidelines of
autonomy, equality, respect, and protection of the vulnerable, the Com-
missioners had put people with disabilities, or aboriginal women, or some
other oppressed group at the centre of its analysis and allowed that
group's concerns and perceptions to direct and guide the discussion.
From such focal points, the issues posed by the technologies and their
ramifications might look very different. In the end, we would have had,
I think, a fuller and more complex understanding of reproductive tech-
10. Ibid. at 52.
11. See Part Three: Overview of Recommendations, ibid. at 1019-50, especially 1023-33,
on the proposed National Reproductive Technologies Commission.
12. Ibid. at 53.
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nologies. However, rather than using the principles to reconceptualize the
analysis, they are used simply as guidelines. As a result, while the
principles clearly have some effect, their impact is limited.
As discussed and applied in the Report, these principles frequently
lack depth and substance. Take equality for example. The appropriate
groups are all named; consultations were held; the current buzz words-
diversity, empowerment, choice, access, and so forth-are liberally
sprinkled throughout the Report. But the attention to these issues seems
largely superficial: there is little evidence of the integration of issues
relating to race, disability, income status and sexual identity into the
substantive discussions in the Report. With the exception of gender,
which has a much more prominent place throughout the discussions,
equality issues are raised more as an addendum than as a central concern.
The focus is on the individual, and issues of systemic discrimination are
largely ignored.
The chapter on assisted insemination provides some good examples of
the shortcomings of the equality analysis as it is applied to lesbians. The
Commissioners begin quite well, having eschewed the heterosexist and
pejorative term "artificial insemination" for the more current "assisted
insemination," although it too has its problems. However, the good news
does not last long. In the first paragraph of the chapter, they refer to the
fact that "the woman [seeking insemination] can be married, single, or a
lesbian." 3 It does not take a very sophisticated equality analysis to
recognize that being a lesbian is not a (non)marital status. Lesbian
denotes one's sexual identity, not whether or not one is in a sexual
relationship. Lesbians can be single or in a relationship; many are
married.14 The listing of lesbian as a relationship status, distinct from
single or married, is the listing of lesbian as "other." "Normal," that is
heterosexual, women can be in a sexual relationship or not, their sexual
identity is not collapsed into their relationship status. "Other women,"
that is lesbians, are included only as a relationship status, implying one
of two things: either that they are only lesbian if they are sexually
involved with another woman, otherwise they are to be considered
(heterosexual) single or married; or that, for lesbians, whether or not they
13. Ibid. at 425. The wording also presents problems for heterosexual women for whom the
only two relationship options recognized by the Report are single and married.
14. Lesbians enter or remain in heterosexual marriages for a variety of reasons, most of which
derive from discrimination. While not an absolute protection, marriage provides a fairly strong
safeguard of heterosexual privilege. The loss of heterosexual privilege may mean, among other
things, the loss of one's children, loss of one'sjob, exile from cultural and social communities,
and loss of family and friends.
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are involved in a sexual relationship is irrelevant to their relationship
status.
The Report then goes on to discuss the "views of Canadians" as
gleaned through the Commission process of surveys and consultations.
Not surprisingly, they found that the majority of Canadians do not support
the use of donor insemination by single heterosexual women or lesbians.
The Commissioners go through a rather lengthy discussion of the
dilemma presented by this apparent conflict between the views of
Canadians and the equality principle. This is not very reassuring on the
equality front.
Discrimination is tolerated, endorsed and promoted by the dominant
groups; that is why it is so entrenched and so difficult to overcome. To
accord the discriminatory views of the majority the power to create a
dilemma is to concede too much, to fall prey to a simplistic notion of
pluralism in which issues of power and domination are invisible. With
one dissenting opinion, the Commissioners work their way through the
dilemma to come to the conclusion that their recommendations must
ensure that "services provided and funded by provinces' health budgets
are not offered in a discriminatory way." 15 They rely upon the Charterto
rationalize their divergence from the views of Canadians:
the Commission believes that society's approach to new reproductive
technologies should be governed by the social values of Canadians. We are
also aware, however, of the difference between social values and indi-
vidual opinions. We believe that the social values held by Canadians are
reflected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
prohibitions on discrimination it contains must be our guide in this
matter.16
This reflects what I would describe as a Pollyanna approach to equality
and "Canadian values." Racism, sexism, lesbian hatred, oppression
based on class or disability are not simply matters of "individual opin-
ion"; they are very much about deeply engrained values and institution-
alized practices. An approach that dismisses discrimination as "indi-
vidual opinion" ignores, even denies, systemic discrimination. Equality
issues relating to access and service delivery can not be meaningfully
addressed in the absence of the recognition of the much more fundamen-
tal nature and source of the problems and a willingness to take a strong
stand against "Canadian values" when they reflect and promote
discrimination.
15. Ibid. at 456.
16. Ibid.
286 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The dissent on this and five other issues in the Report is in keeping with
the muted and conciliatory tone of the Report. Commissioner Scorsone
is the only one of the Commissioners to write a dissent and she does so
on six subjects: Educational Strategies for STD Prevention; Access to
New Reproductive Technologies; Embryo Research; Aspects of Prenatal
Diagnosis; the Genetic Link in Gamete Donation; and Judicial Interven-
tion in Pregnancy.17 These dissents are unobtrusively noted in the body
of the Report with an asterisk and a footnote indicating "See Annex for
dissenting opinion." This "annex" is buried at the end of the Report, with
the glossary and appendices. While I disagree with Commissioner
Scorsone's views on these issues, I find the low level of attention and
significance they are accorded in the Report troubling. It is another
instance where the Report downplays and masks what are, in fact,
fundamental differences, an approach to which Scorsone herself contrib-
utes. She introduces her discussion on the access issue almost
apologetically:
The vast majority of the recommendations of this Commission maintain a
fine and humane balance of the complex medical, ethical, social, and legal
factors which form their context. On very few points do I feel obliged to
object that this balance has not been maintained.18
In the context of the chapter on assistedinsemination, she objects to the
requirement that publicly funded services be made available on a non-
discriminatory basis, that is, she does not agree that single heterosexual
women and lesbians should be given equal access to assisted insemina-
tion. Commissioner Scorsone is of the view that:
there should be no absolute requirement of provision without regard to
"factors such as marital status, sexual orientation or social and economic
status".... Those who consider them relevant, particularly but not only
because of their impact on the best interests of a child and/or for reasons
of conscience orreligious belief, must not have the contrary view imposed
upon them with no possibility of legitimate diversity.'9
The fact that this dissent, that undermines fundamental equality rights
of lesbians (among others), is put forward without direct challenge and
with such an air of gentleness and support suggests to me a lack of
commitment to these equality issues in the body of the Report. It seems
that neither side is pushing these issues, nor pushed on them, for fear that
the fragile "balance" will fall apart. But these are not minor differences
17. Ibid. at Annex (outlined at 1053-65, with detailed reasoning at 1067-1146).
18. Ibid. at 1056.
19. Ibid.
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and the "balance" we are left with does not have the depth and rigour
needed to support it.
The conciliatory nature of Scorsone's dissents rekindles my questions
about the fate of the four outspoken dissenting Commissioners who were
fired from the Commission.2 The Report makes no mention of them or
of what happened, as if they were never appointed. While I recognize that
the final Report is probably not an appropriate place to discuss the internal
conflicts and maelstroms within the Commission, it seems a bit heartless
and misleading not to acknowledge them in any way. It seems to me that
the "ethic of care" and the eight guiding principles might have required
something more on this matter.
While most of the recommendations reflect a policy of containment
and management, the Commission does take a strong and unequivocal
stand on a few issues. In four areas the Commission recommends outright
prohibition under the Criminal Code. For-profit activities in relation to
reproductive materials (sperm, eggs, etc.) would be prohibited, as would
profit based activities, by any party except the birth mother,2 in connec-
tion with preconception arrangements. "[R]esearch involving human
zygotes or embryos directed toward development of ectogenesis, clon-
ing, the creation of human/animal hybrids, and the maturing and fertili-
zation of eggs from fetuses" 22 is recommended to be subjected to criminal
sanction. Finally, unwanted interferences, or threats thereof, with the
physical autonomy of pregnant women are also recommended for prohi-
bition. I find the Commission's recommendations on all of these issues
most interesting, in part because it is not clear why or how the ethic of care
led to these more extreme recommendations with respect to these, and
only these, specific issues.
The singling out of the use of human reproductive materials and
preconception arrangements as the areas in which to sanction the profit
motive is not unusual. This generally accords with public perceptions and
recommendations from other jurisdictions.13 The prohibition focus is
limited to fairly individualized profit-making; it begs the much larger
question of the commercial and profit driven nature of much (if not all)
of this technology and the impact that this has on priorities in terms of
issues like prevention versus "treatment." The Commissioners offer good
insights on many of these economic issues. They are the subject of a
20. Supra note 3.
21. The birth mother is exempt from criminal sanction in order to avoid compounding her
vulnerability (supra note 1 at 689).
22. Ibid. at 108.
23. See discussion in the Report, ibid. at 1001-03, 668-82.
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chapter on commercial interests and new reproductive technologies. In
the context of their discussion of in vitro fertilization, I think that the
Commissioners do a particularly good job in outlining the potential for
the creation of a two-tier health care system and the dangers that inhere
in such a model.24
These larger discussions of the economic implications of reproductive
technologies raise questions about the effectiveness or appropriateness of
hiving off only the more individualistic and publicly visible manifesta-
tions of the profit motive and invoking the extreme measure of criminal
sanction. The Commission might instead, or in addition, have examined
the possibilities for more fundamental change in the economics of
reproductive technologies and even health care more generally. There is
really no discussion of whether or not criminal law is the appropriate
forum for the enforcement of these kinds of social policies. I would want
to explore much more fully the potential ramifications, in this context, of
invoking the criminal law, which is the harshest incarnation of the state,
and the attendant protections for accused. I fear, for example, that a
prohibition of the commercial aspects of "preconception arrangements"
will only force participants to hide their financial arrangements and serve
to render birth mothers vulnerable to increased coercion and exploitation.,
The Commission makes some interesting concessions even within the
prohibitions it does recommend. For example, the Commission supports
the continued payment of a $75 fee, to be increased only to accommodate
inflation, to sperm donors in order to compensate them for their time and
inconvenience. Their rationale for this exception is that "[t]his is unlikely
to act as a financial inducement, given the inconvenience involved."26
While this may be true for many people, there are certainly lots of people
for whom $75 would constitute a fairly major incentive. The Commission
is either promoting the idea that only those for whom $75 is relatively
insignificant should be sperm donors, or it is willing to tolerate profit
motive at this minor level. The questions become more complicated with
respect to the "compensation" of birth mothers under preconception
arrangements. Where does one draw the line between "compensation"
and "profit" for a woman who has carried a fetus for nine months with all
of the attendant risks and limitations? Is the restriction to "compensation"
24. Ibid. at 561-64.
25. SeeD. Majury, "Pre-conception Contracts: Giving theMotherthe Option" in S. Rosenblum
& P. Findlay, eds., Debating Canada's Future: Views from the Left (Toronto: James Lorimer
& Company, 1991) 197.
26. Supra note 1 at 448.
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simply a means of ensuring the exploitation of women who agree to bear
a child for someone else?
The research prohibitions present even more interesting questions
about how and why the Commission chooses to draw the lines where it
does. Cloning, parthenogenesis (creation of a zygote from the female
gamete alone) and ectogenesis (development of a fetus to viability
outside the uterus) are among the kinds of research that the Commission
finds "would contravene the Commission's stated ethical principles and
be contrary to the values of Canadians." 27 The Commission says of
ectogenesis:
The idea that human zygotes could develop and grow into infants in an
artificial womb is seen as quite inappropriate by most Canadians. Such
research, if pursued, would dehumanize motherhood; some have even
envisaged it as opening the way to "baby farms" and femicide. Commis-
sioners regard such research as ethically reprehensible, and we have
recommended that it be prohibited. 8
These are among the strongest words emanating from the Commission
on any topic, one of the few areas in which the recommendation is for
prohibition. Yet these are the same types of arguments that have been, and
continue to be, levelled against in vitro fertilization and genetic technol-
ogy more generally. 29 The Commissioners adopt their position with very
little discussion, almost as if it were self-evident. But I think that there are
lots of questions and I am left wondering, Is there is a fundamental
difference between in vitro fertilization and ectogenesis, or is it simply a
matter of time and familiarity? Why is the line drawn here? Why are only
these areas of research considered dehumanizing? Why is motherhood
singled out for concern, rather than persons with disabilities for whom the
consequences may be even more dire and more immediate? 0
Furthermore, the Report tends to be very doctor- and science-focused
and engages only with a traditional medical model of health care. This is
quite surprising and disappointing at a time when health care in Canada
seems to be becoming more inclusive of other health care practitioners
and of other cultural approaches to, and understandings of, health care.
The limited approach of the Report may have been in part a consequence
27. Ibid. at 618.
28. Ibid. at 744.
29. See, for example, G. Corea, The Mother Machine (New York: Harper & Row, 1985);
R. Arditti, R. Klein & S. Minden, eds., Test-Tube Women (Boston: Pandora Press, 1984);
P. Spallone, Beyond Conception (London: MacMillan Education, 1989); C. Overall, ed., The
Future of Human Reproduction (Toronto: Women's Press, 1989); Misconceptions, supra
note 2.
30. See discussions in the Report, for example, ibid. at 796-802.
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of the limited range of submissions received by the Commission and the
research undertaken by it. The problem may have been that a focus on
"technology" by definition excluded those with a more holistic, non-
allopathic approach.
This same allopathic focus is evident in the Commissioners' emphasis
on "[e]vidence-based medicine," defined as "[m]edical practice based on
data and assessment of whether procedures or treatments are of benefit for
their intended purpose."31 In conjunction with the ethic of care and the
eight guiding principles,
evidence-based medicine shaped the Commission's approach to assessing
the various forms of infertility treatment. It too provided a prism through
which to view the technologies and to determine whether their provision
within the health care system was ethically acceptable and constituted an
appropriate use of resources.32
The definition contains the seeds of a problem that is exemplified in the
Commissioners' application of the concept. The reference to "intended
purpose" ignores the critical question of overall and long term effects. In
keeping with this approach, and with the traditional medical model, the
Commissioners, throughout the Report, refer to "side effects." This
terminology has been criticized because it treats the "intended purpose"
as if it is severable from the "unintended effects."33 Such an approach not
only tends to de-emphasize the significance of these effects but its focus
on intended purpose can delay the discovery of harmful or damaging
impacts. Effectiveness can not be assessed solely, or even primarily, on
the basis of "intended purpose."
However, the need for data implicit in the evidence-based medicine
approach accords with the perceptions of those who initially called for the
establishment of a royal commission. It was hoped that the Commission
would initiate some of the much-needed research on these new technolo-
gies. The Commission did produce a huge quantity of research, fifteen
volumes in all. This vast quantity of material will, undoubtedly, be of
great assistance to future regulators, policy makers and researchers. It is
a valuable resource. However, the research seems to have been directed
more toward compiling existing information than to generating new data
or analysis.
31. Ibid. at 72.
32. Ibid.
33. "Side Effects" was the title of a satirical play produced by Women's Health Interaction
in Ottawa and performed across Canada in 1986. The play, dealing with women and
pharmaceuticals, was premised upon the irony of the term side effects when those effects can
be so devastating, even deadly. See Women's Health Interaction, "Side Effects: A Dramatic
Prescription" (1986) 7:4 Healthsharing 13.
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I have not read, nor even looked at, the research compiled. I am
responding here based on the list of the contents of the research volumes
provided as an appendix to the Report.34 From this it would appear that
a primary research focus was on literature reviews, overviews and
annotated bibliographies. A second focus was on surveys and attitudinal
studies. The Commission initiated or participated in three major surveys
of "representative samples" of Canadians and one "survey of 100 key
representatives from ethnospecific and ethnocultural women's commu-
nities."35 The information from these various surveys is referred to
frequently throughout the Report and seems to have been relied upon
extensively in the Commission's assessment of Canadian values and
responses to reproductive technologies. This kind of research seems
rather limited and ineffectual to me. Reproductive technologies are a
disparate and complex subject about which, I fear, the general public is
ill-informed, largely through media sensationalizations. One of the
recurring themes in discussion of reproductive technologies, including
the Royal Commission Report itself, is the need for public education and
the difficulties encountered in trying to address that need. Consequently,
I am concerned about the level of the knowledge and the accuracy of the
information upon which these "representative samples of Canadians"
based their opinions. I am nervous, in this context, about attaching much
weight to public opinion.
In addition to the compilations and the surveys, the work of the
Commission provided some new information relating to usage and
practice with the new technologies. It is incredibly important to know
what is happening "out there" and I wish that there had been more
research of this nature, and that it had been more of a focus within the
Report itself. However, there seems to have been little else in the way of
primary research undertaken by the Commission; frequently their recom-
mendations point to the need for further tests or scientific data. There is
a desperate need for critical research in so many of these areas, to assist
in determining and assessing the risks involved and the potential benefits
to be derived. I fear that, in practical terms, the effect of the Commission
has been to delay this research and consume research funds that might
otherwise have been available.
There are even larger questions about resource allocation to be asked.
A frequent criticism of the current focus of research and finances on
reproductive technologies is the lack of attention that this has meant with
34. Supra note I at Appendix E, Research Studies, 1253-71.
35. Ibid. at 25.
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respect to the causes and prevention of infertility. 6 The Commissioners
do direct a significant amount of attention to these issues which, in itself,
is an important statement. However, as with so much of the Report, the
discussion of the causes of infertility is highly individualistic. It begins
with an examination of causes related first to sexually transmitted
diseases, followed by smoking, and then age.37 According to the Report,
little can be said about workplace and environmental causes because so
little is known about them. 38 The last chapter on causes includes eating
disorders, endometriosis, substance use and abuse, stress and finally
medical intervention.39 The impression is that infertility is largely due to
the actions of the individual woman or man and this is where there is hope
for change. The systemic issues are, by implication, secondary and, while
the Report certainly indicates that they need to be addressed, the task is
depicted as totally overwhelming. The prevention focus is on individual
responsibility and public education. The rationale for this focus is the lack
of knowledge and information on systemic factors, but there is no
analysis or commentary on this lack of information. The tension between
prevention and treatment is discussed, but resource allocation questions
are never tackled in terms of priorities between the two.
The primary recommendation of the Commissioners is the creation of
a national regulatory and licensing commission, with jurisdiction over
five areas of reproductive technologies: the handling of sperm and
assisted insemination services; assisted conception services; prenatal
diagnosis; research involving human zygotes; and the provision of
human fetal tissue for research or other purposes.4 0 This recommendation
was, perhaps, almost a foregone conclusion. Similar suggestions have
been put forward in other countries and it has much to commend it. The
technologies are too diverse, complex and rapidly expanding for a small,
limited term Royal Commission to be able to come to definitive long term
solutions. There is clearly a need for further study and deliberation, as
well as for ongoing control and enforcement mechanisms. However, the
proposal for the creation of a permanent regulatory body is a bureaucratic
response, accompanied by all of the attendant bureaucratic problems,
including delay, added costs, red tape, and representativeness of the
36. Supra note 27.
37. Supra note 1 at 199-268 (chapters 10-12).
38. Ibid. at 270.
39. Ibid. at 303-38 (chapter 14, "Other Risk Factors and Infertility").
40. Ibid. at 116-17.
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appointees.4 ' In addition, it is a very expensive proposal, which makes its
acceptance unlikely in these economic times. Having put virtually all of
their recommendations for control of reproductive technologies in this
single regulatory basket, the Commissioners may have effectively de-
layed regulation.
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was a
massive undertaking. The completion of the work of the Commission and
the distribution of its report are significant events. Some good and
important work was produced. By and large, the recommendations are
thoughtful and, from my perspective, relatively positive. But overall, I am
disappointed. While the Report is a valuable resource, reading it added
little to my knowledge or understanding of the issues. The Report
presents a muted synthesis of the debates rather than itself making amajor
contribution to those debates. And so I am left with the question, What
was the point? To me, it just was not worth it. We did not, perhaps could
not, get enough from this process to make it worth the time, energy and
resources that went into it, not to mention the suspension of other
activities and the syphoning of funds. While the technologies have
continued to advance unabated, I am not sure that we are really any further
ahead in knowing how to handle them or in implementing any regulatory
action than we were in 1987 when the calls for a royal commission first
went out.
41. The experiences of the Commission itself with respect to these matters would not auger
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